T he threat of smallpox as a bioterrorism weapon and the reintroduction of the smallpox vaccine hold vast implications for occupational health professionals. President Bush accepted the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP) smallpox vaccine guidelines on December 13, 2002, recommending the introduction of a pre-event smallpox vaccination program, aimed at immunizing military personnel and "willing front-line health care workers" (Roos, 2002) . The ACIP further contends every acute care facility should create a smallpox response team consisting of health care workers who can be vaccinated and act as health care providers to the initial smallpox clients evaluated and admitted to a given hospital (Centers for Disease Control [CDC], 2oo3a). Formulating a smallpox policy and protocol has become a key objective for some hospital occupational health departments. This requires a cooperative team approach involving key players from other areas, such as infection control, infectious disease, and the emergency' department. Dissemination of the smallpox vaccination plan generally occurs within employee health, creating the heady task of ensuring that a smallpox policy and procedure is well orchestrated.
Hospital occupational health departments, in particular, have recently become intimately familiar with current CDC publications focusing on the smallpox disease and rec--_.~._--
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ommended guidelines for smallpox vaccination. Many hospital institutions quickly are becoming aware that their objective is to generate a comprehensive policy and protocol for vaccine administration that clearly delineates information based on current CDC recommendations. The occupational health professional bears some responsibility to the organization's employees in assuming the role as smallpox clinician and educator. The task is not simply administering the vaccine, but also understanding the historical and political relevance of smallpox and vaccinia, and serving as a knowledgeable resource about its pathophysiology and clinical manifestations.
BACKGROUND
Smallpox is caused by the variola virus and has been present for at least 3000 years. The first documented confirmed cases of smallpox virus occurred in China, India, and North Africa. Smallpox appeared in Europe in the 6th century, and was later introduced to American civilization via European colonialism. Smallpox was devastating to American civilization, and rapidly depleted the Native American population. Prior to European settlement, the Native American population was estimated to be between 20 and 30 million people. At the end of the 16th century, population estimates were approximately I million (Seercom, 2003) . The introduction of smallpox as a weapon of bioterrorism first occurred in 1763 when British troops handed out blankets infested with smallpox pus and'scabs to Native American tribes (Cowley, 2002) .
In 1796, the first smallpox vaccine was developed by English physician Edward Jenner. Jenner created a smallpox vaccine derived from cowpox germs and successfully inoculated a boy using this method. Mass vaccination efforts were first seen in 1806 with the vaccination of French citizens, followed by large scale vaccination in the United States beginning in the 1820s and continuing through the 1920s (Cowley, 2002) .
The last case of smallpox disease in the United States occurred in 1949, and by 1972, the smallpox vaccination program in the United States concluded. The World Health Organization stated, "smallpox has been eradicated," in 1980 with the only remaining smallpox housed in laboratories in the United States and Russia for research endeavors. The terrorist events of September II, 2001 renewed the threat of smallpox. Concerns mounted that smallpox could be used as a bioterrorism weapon of mass destruction with many Americans vulnerable, having little or no immunity to the disease (Cowley, 2002) .
IMPLICATIONS FOR OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH NURSES
With the burden of a smallpox vaccination program thrust on health care providers once again, it is imperative occupational health clinicians be savvy about the disease as well as the vaccination. Some essential components should be included in the smallpox educators' repertoire of information. When counseling potential smallpox vaccinees, a discussion focusing on smallpox disease should occur.
The Variola Virus
Variola, the virus causing smallpox, consists of two forms, variola minor and variola major. Variola minor is considered an extremely mild form of smallpox with fewer clinical presentations than the various types of variola major. Variola major accounts for a greater number of cases of smallpox, consists of four different types, and is associated with an overall fatality rate of 30%. The ordinary type of variola major is the most'commonly seen form of smallpox, accounting for more than 90% of cases. The modified type of variola major is associated with clinical manifestations of smallpox among previously vaccinated individuals. The modified type tends to be less severe than the ordinary type. Flat and hemorrhagic types of variola major are extremely rare, severe, and usually fatal (CDC, 2(02).
Smallpox is transmitted most efficiently through extended face to face contact with an infected individual, and holds the greatest risk of transmission to other household members and close contacts. The virus can act as a fomite, infecting bedding or linen, but is not generally spread through airborne transmission. The most effective method for preventing the spread of smallpox disease is through early containment of infected individuals and vaccination of all household and close contacts of the individual with smallpox. By increasing the number of vaccinated individuals in the pool of possible contacts, further outbreaks can be controlled. Early eradication pioneers used this approach, and it proved extremely effective (CDC, 2(02).
Screening
The smallpox vaccine, referred to as vaccinia, is composed of a live pox related virus and is very effective in producing immunity for 3 to 5 years in 95% of recipients, with a decreasing level of immunity thereafter (CDC, 2003b) . Occupational health professionals working in settings included in the first stage of the "preevent" vaccination program are not only instrumental in screening individuals for vaccinia, but also asked to administer the vaccine, and ideally, be vaccinated themselves.
Screening the potential smallpox vaccine recipient should include sev- Clinical Rounds: Hospital link eral key components. Smallpox vaccine is contraindicated in individuals with certain conditions-thus, counseling should ensue about the presence of these conditions. Individuals with disorders associated with immunosuppression should not receive the smallpox vaccine. Individuals with a history of eczema, atopic dermatitis, or exfoliative skin disorders are not vaccinia candidates. Furthermore, individuals who have household members with these skin conditions should not receive the smallpox vaccine.
Children younger than 1 should not receive vaccinia. Although those older than 1 and younger than 18 are not absolutely contraindicated from receiving the vaccine, children are not included in the pre-event stage of the immunization program and should not be vaccinated at this time (CDC,2003a) .
Individuals with a history of allergic response to any component of the smallpox vaccine are contraindicated from receiving the smallpox vaccine, as are breastfeeding women. Pregnant women, as well as their household contacts, should not be vaccinated. The CDC also recommends individuals with inflammatory eye disorders being treated with steroid medication should abstain from vaccination until the resolution of the condition (CDC, 2003a) . Screening laboratory work should include an HIV test and a pregnancy test for women of childbearing age (CDC, 2003a) .
The latest addition to the screening criteria and contraindications for smallpox vaccine in the pre-event stage includes obtaining a cardiac risk profile. Individuals with three or more of the following risk factors should not receive smallpox vaccine during the pre-event stage. The risk factors are smoking, hypertension, hypercholesterolemia, diabetes, or an immediate family member diagnosed with a cardiac related condition younger than age 50 (CDC, 2003c) .
Administering the Vaccine
The individual administering the smallpox vaccine makes multiple rapid punctures with a bifurcated nee-die at the delroid region. For individuals who have never received smallpox vaccine, 2 to 3 punctures must be made. Individuals previously vaccinated must receive 15 punctures. It is essential for a trace amount of blood to appear approximately 15 to 20 seconds after the initial puncture. If there is an absence of blood, 3 additional punctures must be applied without adding any additional vaccine to the needle CDC, 2003a).
It is recommended that the individual administering the smallpox vaccine be vaccinated because of the possibility of accidental inoculation while vaccinating others. However, it is not necessary for those who have received the vaccine to delay vaccinating others until confirmation of vaccine success is known. Conferring immunity to smallpox vaccine is a process involving careful examination of the vaccine site for the presence of adequate papule formation, occurring 2 to 5 days after vaccination (CDC, 2oo3a) .
The vaccine site should be covered with gauze, a semi-permeable dressing, and a layer of clothing. The process of viral shedding follows between day 4 to 14 post-vaccination. Vaccinees are at greatest risk for spreading vaccinia to other parts of their body (e.g., nose, lips, eyelid, genitalia, face) and for causing inadvertent transmission to others during this time frame. The scab separates from the skin 14 to 21 days after vaccination, and is the indicator that an individual is considered no longer contagious to others (CDC, 2003a) .
Vaccine recipients should understand that first time vaccinees have a greater reaction than previously vaccinated individuals. Research indicates most vaccine infections occurred from first time vaccinees, most likely because of a longer and greater duration of viral shedding (Neff, 2002) . Infection control measures, such as hand washing, for individuals administering the vaccine as well as vaccine recipients are imperative in reducing the incidence of contact vaccinia infection.
Other important information when counseling the smallpox vac-cine recipient includes discussing common side effects associated with smallpox vaccine, such as headache, body aches, fever, and rash. It is important to ensure that vaccinees understand they should report adverse reactions to occupational health services immediately and the type of issues that may warrant an emergency department evaluation. Tuberculin skin tests and varicella vaccine should not be given for at least 1 month after receiving the smallpox vaccine. However, other live vaccines and inactivated vaccines may be administered simultaneously with vaccinia. Finally, vaccination recipients should not donate blood until 21 days after vaccination or until the scab separates. Individuals who have contracted vaccinia inadvertently should not donate blood for 14 days after resolution of the infection (CDC, 2003a) .
SUMMARY
Because of the announcement of the ACIP recommendation on December 13, 2002 and the com-mencement of the smallpox vaccine program at various facilities nationally, adverse events data are being carefully analyzed by CDC researchers. As previously discussed, CDC recommend a cardiac risk profile be included in the pre-event vaccination screening criteria. A definitive link between the onset of myopericarditis and the smallpox vaccine is suspected, but under investigation. The CDC ascertains there is uncertain evidence of any association between ischemic heart disease and vaccinia (CDC, 2003c) . As the pre-event vaccine program expands, occupational health professionals should be cognizant of changes to the smallpox vaccine recommendations and modify their policies and protocols appropriately. 
